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Using a unique dataset of insurance decisions by over 1,800 large U.S. corporations, this study provides
the first empirical analysis of firm behavior that compares corporate demand for property and catastrophe
insurance (here, terrorism). We combine demand and supply data and apply a simultaneous-equation
approach to address the problem of endogenous premium decisions. The main finding is that demand
for property and catastrophe insurance are not very different and that the demand for catastrophe coverage
is actually more price inelastic. We also show that a corporation’s ability to self-insure affects the
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Classical economic theory considers ﬁrms to be risk-neutral agents; ﬁrms should thus have
no interest in purchasing insurance if the premiums are priced above actuarially fair rates.
In practice, however, we observe that many corporations actually purchase for example
property coverage against ﬁre, natural disaster or terrorism risks. Consumers, on the other
hand, obtain insurance coverage against some property risks (e.g. ﬁre) but are often reluctant
to purchase insurance coverage against certain other risks (e.g. natural disasters, terrorism)
even though premiums are actuarially fair, or even subsidized.
While there are already some empirical studies comparing the demand for catastrophic
and non-catastrophic insurance on the market for homeowners (e.g. Grace, Klein, and
Kleindorfer 2004), no comparable analysis of the market for corporate property insurance
exists. The major impediment to such an analysis was the lack of data. Existing empirical
studies (e.g. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling 2008, Hoyt and Khang 2000) only have information
on the corporate insurance policies for standard property insurance.
The present article beneﬁts from a unique set of insurance purchase decisions for non-
catastrophic and catastrophic risks by over 1,800 large corporations headquartered in the
United States (provided by Marsh & McLennan) (demand side). We combine this data
with pricing decisions by insurance companies (provided by the rating agency A.M. Best)
(supply side) to construct a new cross-sectional dataset on the U.S. corporate insurance
market. The dataset allows us to determine decisions by corporations to buy catastrophe
and non-catastrophe insurance. Using terrorism risk as the catastrophe type, we apply a
simultaneous-equation approach to estimate and compare price elasticities of corporate de-
mand for standard property insurance and for catastrophe risk coverage.1 In comparison
to the existing empirical studies on corporate demand for insurance (e.g. Aunon-Nerin and
Ehling 2008, Hoyt and Khang 2000), the combination of demand and supply data helps us
to address the endogeneity inherent in the relationship between degree of coverage and in-
2surance premium. As such, this paper also presents the ﬁrst consistent estimates of premium
elasticities for the corporate demand for insurance.
Our empirical ﬁndings can be summarized with three important conclusions. First, we
ﬁnd that corporate demand for insurance for catastrophe and non-catastrophe risks does not
diﬀer greatly. Second, the corporate demand for catastrophe coverage is actually more price
inelastic than the demand for non-catastrophe coverage. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a 10% in-
crease in price will reduce quantity of terrorism coverage by only 2.42% whereas it will reduce
the quantity of property coverage by 2.91%. This result is in contrast to the ﬁndings with
respect to individual insurance choices in laboratory experiments (e.g. Ganderton, Brook-
shire, McKee, Stewart, and Thurston 2000) and empirical studies on homeowners insurance
(Grace, Klein, and Kleindorfer 2004). These studies show that the majority of homeown-
ers do not purchase catastrophic coverage voluntarily and those cases that do obtain some
coverage, exhibit a very elastic demand. Managers acting on behalf of a ﬁrm do exhibit a
diﬀerent behavior than homeowners making choices for protecting (or not protecting) their
residence. Third, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s ability to self-insure (higher solvency ratio) only
decreases the demand for catastrophe insurance but has no signiﬁcant impact on the demand
for property insurance.
Our paper contributes to the literature that examines why ﬁrms purchase insurance. One
strand discusses how the behavior of (risk-averse) managers within the ﬁrm can actually
explain corporate demand for insurance. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993) show how the risk of bankruptcy and the existence of incentive systems within
the ﬁrm could lead managers to act in a risk-averse manner on behalf of the company. In
this spirit, Mayers and Smith (1982) and Han (1996) argue that risk-averse managers have
an incentive to purchase property insurance to protect their interests and reputation. More
recent literature supports this view and suggests that some of the variance in corporate
performance can be attributed to discretionary behavior of individual managers (e.g. Adams,
Almeida, and Ferreira 2005, Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).2 Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
3provide compelling evidence that investment and ﬁnancing decisions of ﬁrms depend on
executives’ ﬁxed eﬀects, such as how age and level of education aﬀect risk-taking behavior,
and that the extent of this inﬂuence is economically large.
A more complete understanding as to how managers make decisions about purchasing
insurance coverage on behalf of the ﬁrms they work for should then help explain corporate
demand for insurance. Managers have to estimate unknown future outcomes to evaluate
whether - and at what price - insurance is eﬃcient. Contributions from behavioral economics
and psychology suggest that decision making under uncertainty is not always consistent with
the standard rational choice model, but rather, can be subject to choice heuristics and biases
(e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1973, Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman, Daniel and
Tversky, Amos 2000, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010). According to these studies, how indi-
viduals perceive the risk could be a much more important factor inﬂuencing decisions than
estimates of the risk provided by experts (Van den Steen 2004). This aspect is particularly
relevant for insurance decisions on very low-probability but high-consequence events on which
this paper focuses. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) propose a useful dichotomy in risk per-
ception of such catastrophic events: typically, individuals either ignore those low-probability
risks (optimism) or over-estimate them by focusing on possible outcomes without paying
much attention to the likelihood of them happening (availability bias). Such bimodal dis-
tributions of behavior were also shown experimentally by McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey
(1987) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2007) analyzing actual long-term care insurance deci-
sions by individuals. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) combine aspects of these representative
heuristics in a more formal framework. Their model suggests that individuals tend to largely
neglect risks with a very low probability. However, once a low-probability event takes place,
the risk is back in their attention and individuals tend to overinsure against this risk. Ka-
planski and Levy (2010) show media coverage of aviation disasters leads to more pessimistic
behaviour on the stock market and a short-term decrease in demand for risky assets.
4In the context of homeowners’ insurance against catastrophic risks, many homeowners
appear downplay the risk. They exhibit over-optimism about the likelihood of a disaster
and are thus willing to pay for coverage only when it costs less than the actuarially fair
price. One reason for this behavior is because their perceived likelihood of the event is below
their threshold of concern. In this case individuals assume that "It won’t happen to me"
- a form of probability neglect (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Kunreuther, Novemsky, and
Kahneman 2001, Sunstein 2002).
Even when the cost of insurance is subsidized, many people located in high risk areas
still do not purchase coverage; this has been shown to be the case for ﬂood risk in the United
States (Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Borkan, and Katz 1978, Michel-Kerjan
and Pedell 2010). In the same spirit, Grace, Klein, and Kleindorfer (2004) analyzed insur-
ance purchase decisions of homeowners living in hurricane-prone areas of the U.S., ﬁnding
that even those homeowners who purchased insurance against catastrophe risks (hurricane)
exhibited a more price elastic demand for catastrophic risks than for non-catastrophe risks
(ﬁre). A related ﬁnding is that many individuals are willing to pay signiﬁcantly more for
non-catastrophe insurance than for catastrophe insurance (Ganderton, Brookshire, McKee,
Stewart, and Thurston 2000).
Turning to ﬁrm behavior, there is already some empirical evidence that managers’ de-
cisions are also aﬀected by over-optimism (e.g. Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Malmendier and
Tate 2005, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 2007). The question we want to study in this
article is whether we will thus observe a similar pattern in the corporate context as the one
characterizing individuals’ insurance decisions. More speciﬁcally, do individual managers of
a ﬁrm treat low-probability, high-consequence risks (e.g., natural disasters, terrorism) very
diﬀerently than non-catastrophe risks (e.g., ﬁre) when they purchase insurance against those
respective risks, and if so how? Given the series of catastrophes that occurred worldwide in
the past decade, a better understanding of these ﬁnancial decisions has become even more
5important. Our analysis reveals that a majority of ﬁrms does not only purchase catastrophe
insurance, but also that exhibits a signiﬁcantly price inelastic demand for such protection.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 1, we provide
some background information on terrorism insurance in the United States and describe our
data. In Section 2, we present our empirical strategy. The results of our analysis are discussed
in Section 3 with robustness checks provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
II. Data
Before discussing our dataset and empirical strategy, we provide some background infor-
mation about the nature of the terrorism insurance market in the United States. Prior to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance losses from terrorism were viewed as
so improbable that the risk was not explicitly mentioned in any standard policy and hence
the rate for providing such coverage to ﬁrms was never calculated. Terrorism was covered
de facto in most commercial insurance contracts. Things changed radically in 2001. The
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks killed over 3,000 people and injured more than 2,250 oth-
ers. The attacks also inﬂicted damage estimated at nearly $80 billion, about $32.5 billion of
which (2001 prices) was covered by insurance (U.S. President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets 2006). In response to 9/11, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was
passed by Congress and signed into law by the President on November 26, 2002. 3The Act
has been renewed several times and is now extended to the end of 2014.
The operation of this new terrorism insurance market is somewhat complex and it is not
the purpose of this paper to analyze it (see Brown, Cummins, Lewis, and Wei 2004, Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan 2004). Still, there are features of TRIA that will be important
for our analysis and also for the policy implications of our ﬁndings. First, with TRIA, in-
surers are required to oﬀer terrorism coverage to all their commercial clients (a legal "make
available" requirement). These ﬁrms have the right to refuse this coverage.4 Second, the
6federal government provides insurers with no-cost up-front reinsurance above a predeﬁned
deductible for each insurer.5 More speciﬁcally, the federal government is responsible for pay-
ing 85% of the insurer’s loss above the insurers’ deductible; the insurer covers the remaining
15%. This joint federal-private insurance responsibility is capped at $100 billion. No-cost
up-front reinsurance would provide insurers with liquidity in the post-attack period. TRIA
stipulates that the federal government can recoup part of its payment over time against the
entire insurance industry not just those insurers whose losses were partially covered by the
public sector.
Let us now turn to the presentation of the data set. Data on the demand side (i.e.,
corporations purchasing insurance) was obtained from Marsh, one of the world largest insur-
ance brokers. Marsh provided us with company-level insurance contract data on their clients
headquartered in the U.S. in 2007. Data was reported through an intranet form completed
by brokers of the diﬀerent Marsh oﬃces in the United States. Company identities were kept
anonymous through the use of random ID numbers designed speciﬁcally for this study. We
assume that idiosyncrasies among brokers or oﬃces were randomly distributed across the
dataset. The original dataset included 1,884 companies. We have removed companies with
total insured value lower than $1 million. Of the remaining 1,808 companies, 1,064 had
purchased terrorism insurance in conjunction with their normal property insurance. This
implied a market penetration of 59%6. Of these 1,064 companies we have observations for
628 on all relevant dependent and explanatory variables. The data does not include exact
information on the physical location of the companies’ assets, so we used the location of the
Marsh oﬃce which brokered their policy (typically in the same location as the headquarters
of the company) as the proxy for location. Given that each individual contract covered mul-
tiple locations for a single company, we assume that the number of locations per company
is randomly distributed across our dataset. (Marsh divides their oﬃces into the nine major
regions, each combining a number of states.7) Firms in the dataset were divided into 20
industry sectors. Table I shows the distribution of companies within the full sample across
7these diﬀerent industry sectors. It also shows the number of companies which had purchased
terrorism insurance.
[ INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE ]
The average size of the companies in our sample is measured by assets that are covered
under property insurance; that is the total insured value (TIV hereafter). This measure
only contains tangible assets but no values associated with business interruptions or workers’
compensation. The mean for the TIV variable in our sample is $1.75 billion (median of $2.95
billion) (see Table II)8.
[ INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE ]
The focus of the empirical analysis is our full subsample of 628 companies that have
terrorism coverage. Our dependent variable is the degree of coverage, CoverTerror, deﬁned
as the ratio of the limit on the terrorism insurance policy the ﬁrm purchased (i.e., the
maximum terrorism claim payment it can receive from its insurers minus the deductible)
to TIV . We construct the variable for property insurance, CoverProperty, in a similar way.
It is deﬁned as the ratio of the limit on the property insurance policy the ﬁrm purchased
(i.e., the maximum property claim payment they can receive from their insurers) to TIV .
We ﬁnd that the mean degree of coverage against catastrophe risks, CoverTerror, is 0.480,
and the mean degree of coverage against non-catastrophe risks CoverProperty, is 0.548. The
premiums paid by the company for terrorism insurance and for property insurance are labeled
PremiumTerror and PremiumProperty, respectively. A better measure of the cost of insurance
is the premium paid by these companies per $1,000 of coverage (limit of the policy) and we
calculate this ﬁgure for both terrorism and property insurance (PremiumTerror=LimitTerror
and PremiumProperty=LimitProperty); we use these two variables in our demand treatment
(see equations (1) and (2) below). We ﬁnd that on average, ﬁrms pay eight times more for
property than they do for terrorism ($4.848 versus $0.592 per $1,000 of coverage). Statistics
on all these demand side variables are reported in Table III.
8[ INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE ]
To account for the demand-supply interaction that determines insurance purchase de-
cisions, we gathered supply-side data on the insurance companies providing property and
terrorism coverage to all the ﬁrms in our sample in 2007 using annual A.M. Best Insurance
Reports-P/C US & Canada (Version 2008.1). In addition, the rating agency A.M. Best
provided us with the premiums collected by these insurance companies for all non-life insur-
ance lines and for terrorism lines from 2002 to 2008 (so we could determine that there were
no peculiarities in 2007). The choice of the supply variables is based on Kleﬀner and A.
(1996) who identify a number of factors that determine insurers’ ability to write corporate
coverage. It typically depends on the characteristics of their portfolio of corporate clients
and on ﬁnancial indicators that have an impact on the cost of risk bearing. We thus use the
following variables for the empirical analysis: (a) total assets; (b) overall liquidity, and (b)
A.M. Best rating (proxy for ﬁnancial strength).
Two other variables were created to analyze the supply side. We determined for 2006 the
exposure share that each company in our Marsh sample had in the portfolio of its insurer.
We could then create a diversiﬁcation proxy: considering the portfolio of a given insurer,
the lower the share each one of its clients represents, the more diversiﬁed its exposure is.
So for each ﬁrm i insured by insurer j, we calculate the ratio between the limit of the
terrorism insurance policy i (i.e., maximum possible payment the insurers will have to make
for its client i) over the total insurance premiums collected for all lines of business exposed
to terrorism risk from all the client ﬁrms of insurer j. This ratio can be interpreted as
a measure of exposure for insurer j: the higher the ratio, the less client-diversiﬁed the
insurer’s portfolio is. We call this variable Frac LimitTerror. We construct a similar variable
for property coverage, Frac LimitProperty. These two variables will be compared so we can
better measure whether the no-cost up-front federal reinsurance had an impact on how
insurers manage their concentration of terrorism exposure. We expect that insurers will take
on more concentrated risks with terrorism than they do for the standard property because
9they can transfer part of their exposure to the government free of charge. The descriptive
statistics of the supply side data are presented in Table IV.
[ INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE ]
The supply and demand datasets were then merged using the unique insurance company
identiﬁer, j. Based on available information for all these variables, it was possible to identify
the full information on insurance supplier for 421 of the 628 large companies in the subsample;
our demand-supply analysis thus focuses on these 421 ﬁrms. The ﬁnal sample consists of 15
diﬀerent large insurance suppliers.
III. Empirical Approach
To investigate the eﬀects of heuristics on the corporate demand for insurance, we proceed
as follows. We ﬁrst construct a demand/supply system of equations for each type of risk,
terrorism (catastrophic risk) and property (non-catastrophic risk). We then compare the
price elasticities of the demand for insurance for the two diﬀerent types of risk to identify
whether there is an over-optimism bias. If over-optimism plays an important role, the de-
mand for catastrophe risk insurance should be much more price elastic (as Grace, Klein, and
Kleindorfer (2004) have shown to be the case for homeowners) to reﬂect a lower willingness
to pay for catastrophe insurance coverage than for non-catastrophe. Moreover, to identify if
there is a possible "New York eﬀect" we also undertake a series of analyses speciﬁc to the
New York area which has been the target of the last two Al Qaeda attacks, in 1993 and
2001. Here we estimate the demand/supply system of equations for a New York sub-sample
and compare our results with those obtained for the rest of the country.
On the demand side, we ﬁrst identify the drivers of the corporate decision to purchase
coverage against terrorism and property. We use only the subsample of companies that have
bought both types of coverage. We analyze the determinants of the quantity of terrorism
10coverage purchased and compare these results with the quantity of property insurance pur-
chased. To determine the key drivers of the corporate insurance demand, we construct the
following equation:





+ Ii + Ri + 
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cij (1)
where Covercij denotes, for company i, its degree of coverage for risk type c, (terrorism
or property). TIV is the total insured value of company i and Premium=Limit is the cost
of insurance (premium per $1,000 of coverage limit for the respective type of insurance). I
and R are industry and region speciﬁc dummies; 1
cij is the error term and  are coeﬃcients
to be estimated. We are primarily interested in the coeﬃcient 2, that exhibits the price
elasticity of demand. We expect 2 to be negative and signiﬁcant for both types of risk.
Under the assumptions that premiums for both risks are actuarially fair and that individual
insurance decision on catastrophic risk is biased by some heuristic, 2 should be larger in
the case of terrorism insurance compared to standard property insurance.
We now turn to the supply side and analyze some key factors that can impact insur-
ance pricing (e.g., concentration of exposure, assets, liquidity, and rating). Once again, we

















where Frac Limitcij is, the share of company i’s property or terror limit in insurer j’s
portfolio. ln(Limitcij) reﬂects the policy limit of the respective type of insurance c. Covercij
is the degree of coverage of each policy. Assetsj are the total assets of insurer j and Liquidity
denotes its overall liquidity. As in (1), I and R are industry and region speciﬁc dummies, 

are parameters to be estimated and 2
cij is the error term.
11We apply a simultaneous equations model that accounts for the interaction between the
corporation’s choice on the degree of coverage and the insurance company’s choice on the
amount of premium to charge. We therefore combine the above equations and construct a
system of equations. However, OLS would render inconsistent results because the endogenous
variables are used as regressors in the respective other equation. Simultaneity and correlation
of the error terms in equations (1) and (2) are likely to bias the results and estimating
equations (1) and (2) separately would yield inconsistent parameter estimates. We decided
to use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate the parameters of interest. 3SLS combines
the advantages of 2SLS (two-stage least squares ) and SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions)
models and allows us to correct for the potential simultaneity bias and the presence of error
term correlation. The estimates are performed for property and for terrorism insurance
coverage separately.
IV. Results
The results of our estimates are presented in Table V. The ﬁrst four columns show the coeﬃ-
cients of the supply and the demand side estimates for terrorism and property insurance for
the full sample. Comparing the coeﬃcients of our variable of key interest (Premium/Limit),
we ﬁnd that price elasticities for catastrophe (terrorism) and non-catastrophe risk (property)
are actually very similar: -0.242 and -0.293, respectively. As predicted, these coeﬃcient are
negative and signiﬁcant. In fact, corporate demand for terrorism insurance is actually more
price inelastic than for property insurance, even though the diﬀerence is small. A price
increase of 10% will decrease the quantity of property insurance purchased by 2.93% and
the quantity of terrorism insurance by only 2.42%. Our estimates stand in contrast to ex-
isting studies that insurance demand for catastrophic risk is much more price-elastic than
for non-catastrophic risk (Grace, Klein, and Kleindorfer 2004) found a -1.9 coeﬃcient for
catastrophe risk and -0.4 for non-catastrophe risk). We also analyze the possible existence
12of a New York eﬀect, but the results are very similar those using the entire sample (Table
V).
[ INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE ]
From the analysis we also see that the coeﬃcient of TIV (-0.060) is negative and highly
signiﬁcant, indicating that larger companies have, on average, a lower degree of coverage
than smaller ﬁrms (ratio limit over TIV is lower). This might be due to higher geographical
diversiﬁcation of their assets. It could also be that smaller ﬁrms purchase insurance to
access risk-management expertise of the insurers (Doherty 2000). Larger companies are
more likely to have some form of in-house risk-management and therefore require less of
these "real services" from the insurer. In addition, larger companies also have better access
to short-term capital and might substitute market insurance with self-insurance (Hau 2004).
Comparing the coeﬃcients of the TIV shows that this eﬀect (larger companies have a lower
degree of coverage than smaller ﬁrms) is smaller in the case of terrorism insurance, though
(coeﬃcient of -0.060 versus -0.103 in the case of property). Terrorism risk can be considered
more complex than standard risk and it is more costly to generate information about the
risk in-house. As a result, companies might have an additional incentive to take advantage
of insurers’ risk-management expertise in that case.
We now turn to the supply side and the determinants of insurers’ pricing decisions (Table
V). Contract-speciﬁc variables such as the policy limit and the degree of coverage are impor-
tant determinants of premiums charged by the insurer. As shown in Table V (full sample)
both variables, ln(Limit) (-0.206 and -0.331, for terrorism and property respectively) and
Cover (-3.229 and -2.348), have a negative sign and are highly signiﬁcant. This indicates
the insurance companies give discounts for larger limits in general, as well as for a higher
degree of coverage. Both can be explained by decrease of some administrative costs (i.e.,
transaction costs related to evaluate the customer’s exposure to a certain risk) with higher
limits and degrees of coverage. Another interesting result is the diﬀerent eﬀects of the share
of policy limit in the insurer’s portfolio, Frac Limit. This is our empirical proxy for the
13insurer’s diversiﬁcation eﬀort. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant (at least at the 10% level)
eﬀect for property insurance (0.150) but not a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the case of terrorism.
This ﬁnding has two important policy implications of the eﬀect of federal intervention in
the market for terrorism insurance. First, in contrast to the insurer’s property portfolio, the
terrorism portfolio beneﬁts from free up-front reinsurance by the federal government. This
has certainly led insurers to provide much more capacity than they would have otherwise
since they are not responsible for all the potential losses they cover. These same insurers
might be less careful about concentration of risks for terrorism than they are for property
insurance (hence a 0.053 coeﬃcient which is very close to zero). Second, the obligation of
insurers to oﬀer terrorism insurance to every corporate customer with a property insurance
policy reduces the insurer’s options to make appropriate decisions regarding diversiﬁcation
in its portfolio (unless they terminate the contract for property coverage too, which they are
unlikely to do). The coeﬃcients for Assets and Liquidity - which are proxies for the insurers’
ﬁnancial strength and capacity to meet their obligations - do not appear to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, indicating that these two variables do not have a signiﬁcant impact on
insurers’ behavior.
V. Robustness Analysis
In a ﬁrst robustness check, we include in our estimates several additional control variables
identiﬁed in the literature (see Table VI). The theoretical model developed by Hau (2004)
and the empirical results by Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) suggest that companies with
better access to the capital market have lower insurance coverage. We therefore include the
solvency ratio (a measure of how a company meets its long-term debt) and the current ratio
(a measure of how well a company meets its short-term debt) as additional regressors in our
demand side estimates. Data on solvency ratio and current ratio are available for only 137
and 129 companies, respectively. The results presented in Table VI indicate that estimates
14are robust to the inclusion of these ratios (demand is more inelastic for terrorism coverage
than it is for property coverage). Solvency ratio appears to have a substitution eﬀect: a higher
solvency ratio will decrease the demand for insurance coverage. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
only in the case of terrorism insurance (-0.076). This result suggests that corporations use
their ability to self-insure (higher solvency ratio) as a substitute for catastrophe insurance
but not for property insurance. Current ratio, which measures how well a company meets
its short-term debt, appears to have no impact on the demand for neither property nor
catastrophe insurance. The insurer’s ﬁnancial strength, proxied by A.M. Best’s ﬁnancial
rating, appears to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on pricing either. Our results stay robust if
these variables are included.
[ INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE ]
We did a second robustness check to overcome a challenge inherent to the fact that our
sample might not be random. The dataset we received from Marsh contains a portfolio
of 1,884 companies, where only 1,064 companies decided to purchase terrorism coverage.
The quantity of insurance a company purchases from its insurer is a decision made by each
company and might be driven by unobserved characteristics for which we cannot control. For
instance, in the 620 companies that did not purchase insurance there could be, as discussed in
the introduction, managers who simply undervalue the probability. Therefore, the subsample
of those companies that do have terrorism insurance might be a self-selected sample.
The solution to this problem is to extend the sample-separation case generally charac-
terized by two simultaneous equations systems corresponding to the two diﬀerent regimes (a
company has catastrophe insurance or not) and a selectivity criterion that determines the
regime to which the observations belong. This procedure was suggested by Lee, Maddala,
and Trost (1980), who overcome this limitation by reﬂecting the self-selection process in the
ﬁrst stage. We also assume that the probability of a company buying terrorism insurance has
an inﬂuence on the degree of coverage in the second stage. To our knowledge, this approach
is the only consistent estimator given the distribution of our company sample.
15In the ﬁrst stage we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is a dichoto-
mous indicator equal to 1 for companies that have catastrophe coverage and equal to 0
otherwise. We use the natural logarithm of the total insured value of company, TIV (an
empirical proxy for the size of the company). The expectations on the sign of this size vari-
able are not clear a priori. On the one hand, as discussed in the previous section, larger
companies are supposedly more able to diversify their risks. As a result, they should be less
likely to buy catastrophe coverage than small ﬁrms. This suggests a negative sign. On the
other hand, larger companies are a more visible (and arguably, a more attractive) target for
terrorist groups who seek to inﬂict major economic disruption and impose fear on a large
number of people. Larger companies might thus be more likely to buy terrorism coverage
and more likely to accept a higher cost of coverage as well. This suggests a positive sign. It
is not clear which one will be the most important eﬀect.
The ﬁrst stage speciﬁcation also demands a variable that fulﬁlls the exclusion criterion.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that individuals not only diﬀer in their exposure to risk
but also in their preferences for insurance coverage. They provide evidence that individuals
who behave more cautiously in their day-to-day life are also more likely to purchase a large
quantity of insurance. We thus use information on a company’s insurance decision against
ﬂood risks as a proxy for its preference for insurance coverage against catastrophic risks. We
construct a dummy variable that switches to 1 if the company has purchased some ﬂood
insurance and equals 0 otherwise as our selection variable. We expect the ﬂood variable to
yield a positive coeﬃcient.
The predicted value from the ﬁrst stage is then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio,9
which measures the likelihood that a company has purchased some terrorism coverage. Fol-
lowing the methodology developed in Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980), we estimate a reduced
form equation of the pricing model and integrate the inverse Mills ratio. We then use the
predicted values of this estimate to construct an instrument for premium/limit to be used
16in the ﬁnal demand side estimate of the coverage. This demand side equation thus includes
the exogenous regressors, the instrument and the inverse Mills ratio.
The results in Table VII reveal that our estimates are again robust. The selection variable
Flood has a strong positive coeﬃcient (0.307) in the ﬁrst stage estimates. The coeﬃcient of
the inverse Mills ratio, , is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. This result suggests that the
selection bias is quantitatively not important in our case.
[ INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE ]
The price elasticity of the demand for insurance can be driven by other time invariant
company speciﬁc eﬀects that we do not observe. Omitting these factors could result in
biased estimates. For example, we do not observe a company’s past experience with terrorist
attacks or its overall risk-management strategy. Although our dataset does not contain
multiple observations per company over time, we have two observations per company; one
for each type of insurance. We can use these two observations, pool the data, and construct
a panel dataset that allows us to control for company speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Given that each
company purchases both types of insurance from the same supplier, this setting is used to
control for company-insurer-dyad ﬁxed eﬀects.
We construct the following demand function:





















denote for the degree of coverage and the cost of in-
surance for company i’s insurance policy of risk type c with insurer j. TRIA is a dummy









is an interaction term between premium and the TRIA dummy.
3 presents the diﬀerence in the price elasticity of demand for the terrorism risk. i captures
company ﬁxed eﬀects.
17We expect 1 to be negative and 3 to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As done
before to account for the potential endogeneity in the relationship between degree of coverage
and insurance premium, we apply a standard IV approach and use Frac Limit and an
interaction term between TRIA and insurer j’s expense ratio as exogenous instruments for
insurance premium. The results of the panel-estimates are presented in Table VIII. Column
1 shows the estimated coeﬃcients from the standard ﬁxed eﬀects model. The coeﬃcient for
insurance premium (-0.179) is negative and smaller than the ones presented in Tables VI and
VII. TRIA depicts a signiﬁcant positive sign, indicating that the ﬁrms choose a higher degree
of coverage for the catastrophic risk. The interaction term between the TRIA dummy and
the premium variable is positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that the demand for terrorism
insurance is more price-inelastic (1+3). However, once we account for endogeneity (column
2), the coeﬃcient of the interaction term renders insigniﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient of the
premium elasticity stays signiﬁcant. This supports our cross-section results in Tables VI and
VII and shows once again no important diﬀerence in the premium elasticity of corporate
demand for insurance against standard risk and catastrophic risk.
[ INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE ]
VI. Concluding Remarks
There have been important theoretical contributions during the past two decades that help
explain decisions made by corporations as to how they should protect their assets against
all sorts of risks they face, and the role that insurance can play in that regard. A principal
reason for the absence of empirical studies to test these theories has been the inability to
obtain data on insurance decisions by large number of ﬁrms. Proprietary issues, regulatory
systems and anti-trust law make it often diﬃcult for the research community to access a
data sample large enough to undertake substantial empirical analysis of corporate insurance
decisions.
18This paper provides the ﬁrst analysis of U.S. corporate demand for insurance, and com-
pares ﬁrms’ behavior for catastrophe and non-catastrophe risks. We looked speciﬁcally at
1,808 large companies across regions and industry sectors that are headquartered in the
United States. We used terrorism threat as our catastrophic risk and property insurance as
the non-catastrophic risk. We found that a large portion of these companies did not purchase
terrorism insurance, maybe because their managers are over-optimistic and do not believe
another major terrorist attack could seriously impact the operation of the ﬁrm.
For those companies with terrorism coverage, however, the demand functions for catas-
trophe and non-catastrophe insurance do not exhibit major diﬀerences in price elasticity.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that corporate demand for catastrophe insurance is slightly more in-
elastic than demand for property insurance. This empirical result diﬀers from other studies
conducted in the context of homeowners’ decision making where demand for catastrophe risk
insurance was shown to be much more price elastic than for standard property insurance.
Our analysis reveals that managers who purchased terrorism insurance are highly risk averse
with respect to catastrophic losses.
One reason for the diﬀerence between how individuals behave as homeowners and as
managers of a ﬁrm is that, in the latter case, they do not have to personally pay for that
insurance; the company does. Moreover, should a disaster occur, managers can have their
bonuses reduced or even be ﬁred for not having purchased catastrophe coverage but they do
not personally bear the ﬁnancial cost associated with purchasing it.
Finally, these ﬁndings should be regarded as a starting point for future research in the
emerging ﬁeld of catastrophe economics. It would be useful to access more detailed corpo-
rate information on liquidity, short-term credit or decision structures within the company
(including incentive systems in place) to provide a comparative analysis of how these other
characteristics aﬀect corporate decisions for catastrophe and non-catastrophe risk insurance.
It would also be useful to extend the analysis provided here to extreme events other than
terrorism (e.g., technological accidents of large magnitude, natural disasters), and also to
19countries with diﬀerent institutional settings and diﬀerent degrees of government involve-
ment in commercial insurance markets to determine how these factors inﬂuence managerial
behavior with respect to catastrophes.
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24Notes
1Analyzing how corporations consider terrorism risk, our analysis also contributes to a growing literature
on economics of national security which looks at the eﬀects of terrorism on a variety of indicators such as
companies’ stock value (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Brown, Cummins, Lewis, and Wei 2004), vacancy
rate in business oﬃces of large cities (Abadie and Dermisi 2008) or GDP (Tavares 2004).
2Corporate demand for property insurance can be also explained by contractual obligations (Garven
and MacMinn 1993), tax incentives (Main 1983, Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993), the need to increase
liquidity and avoid the costs of bankruptcy (Mayers and Smith 1982, MacMinn 1987, Hau 2004) or access
to the risk-management expertise of the insurers (Doherty 2000).
3The complete version of the original Act can be downloaded at: http://www.treas.gov/oﬃces/domestic-
ﬁnance/ﬁnancial-institution/terrorism-insurance/claims-process/program.shtml
4Note that attacks using weapons of mass destruction (so-called CBRN; chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear) are typically excluded from terrorism coverage. To the contrary, workers’ compensation laws
do not permit employers or insurers to exclude coverage for worker injuries caused by terrorism. It is thus
covered by the insurers whether or not its clients has purchased speciﬁc terrorism coverage or not.
5The deductible is deﬁned as a percentage (20% in 2007, the year of our data) of all premiums earned by
the insurer in the preceding year in all the lines of business covered under TRIA.
6Market penetration/take-up rate is deﬁned here as the percentage of companies that have a terrorism
insurance policy, and not the amount of assets insured against terrorism over the total amount of assets.
7Central Midwest - Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Wisconsin; Mid-Atlantic - District of
Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Philadelphia), Virginia; New York Metro - New Jersey
(Morristown), New York (New York), Connecticut (Norwalk); Northeast - Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Maine, New York (Rochester, Syracuse), Rhode Island; South Central - Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas;
Southeast - Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia; Southwest
- Arizona, California (Los Angeles, Newport Beach, and San Diego); Upper Midwest - Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh); West - Alaska, California (San Francisco, San Jose), Colorado, Hawaii,
Oregon, Utah, Washington. (Note that California, New York, and Pennsylvania include oﬃces that are in
multiple regions. The speciﬁc locations are included in parentheses.)
8We also have information for the full sample as to whether a company has some form of ﬂood insurance,
but do not have complete information on the ﬂood contract. We converted this information into a binary
yes/no variable, which we will use when undertaking robustness checks.
259 The inverse Mills ratio is calculated by dividing the probability density function by the cumulative
distribution function.
26Table I
Distribution of Companies and Terrorism Insurance Across Industries - Full
Sample
Distribution of companies for the full sample of 1,808 large clients and companies with terrorism insurance
(1,064). Data stems from Marsh & McLennan and is a cross-section of corporations headquartered in the
U.S. for 2007. Table contains absolute number of ﬁrms and fraction per industry.
Industry Firms in % With terror in %
insurance
Agriculture 11 0:61% 3 27:27%
Construction & Design 46 2:54% 23 50:00%
Distribution 35 1:94% 19 54:29%
Education 75 4:15% 55 73:33%
Financial Institutions 78 4:31% 56 71:79%
Food & Beverages 79 4:37% 40 50:63%
Healthcare 156 8:63% 115 73:72%
Hospitality & Gaming 84 4:65% 56 66:67%
Manufacturing 452 25:00% 199 44:03%
Media 46 2:54% 29 63:04%
Mining 18 1:00% 3 16:67%
Pharmaceutical 36 1:99% 20 55:56%
Power & Utilities 105 5:81% 69 65:71%
Public Entities 59 3:26% 35 59:32%
Real Estate 124 6:86% 97 78:23%
Retail & Wholesale 125 6:91% 70 56:00%
Services 120 6:64% 76 63:33%
Technology 68 3:76% 41 60:29%
Telecomm 27 1:49% 17 62:96%
Transportation 64 3:54% 41 64:06%
Total 1,808 1,064
27Table II
Descriptive Statistics - Full sample
Summary statistics for the full sample of 1,808 large clients of Marsh & McLennan. Cross-section data
for corporations headquartered in the U.S. for 2007. Data deﬁnitions: Terrorism, a dummy variable that
switches to one if the company has purchased some coverage against terrorism risk and zero otherwise. TIV ,
the total insured value hereafter). This measure only contains tangible assets but no values associated with
business interruptions or workers’ compensation. Flood Insurance, a dummy variable that switches to one
if the company has purchased some ﬂood coverage and zero otherwise.
Obs. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Terrorism (Yes/No) 1,808 0.589 0.492 0.000 1.000
TIV ($ million) 1,808 1,750 5,780 1.000 93,221
Flood Insurance (Yes/No) 1,808 0.740 0.439 0.00 1.000
Table III
Descriptive Statistics - Companies with Terror Coverage
Summary statistics for the full sample of 628 large clients of Marsh & McLennan that have purchased ter-
rorism coverage. Cross-section data for corporations headquartered in the U.S. for 2007. Data deﬁnitions:
CoverTerror, the ratio of the limit on the terrorism insurance policy the ﬁrm purchased (i.e., the maximum
terrorism claim payment it can receive from its insurers minus the deductible) to TIV . CoverProperty,
the ratio of the limit on the property insurance policy the ﬁrm purchased to TIV . PremiumTerror,
premiums paid by the company for terrorism insurance per $1,000 of coverage (limit of the policy).
PremiumProperty, premiums paid by the company for property insurance per $1,000 of coverage (limit of the
policy). We calculate this ﬁgure for both terrorism and property insurance (PremiumTerror=LimitTerror
and PremiumProperty=LimitProperty)
Obs. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
CoverTerror 628 0.480 0.376 0.002 1.000
CoverProperty 628 0.548 0.365 0.008 1.000
TIV ($ million) 628 1,970 5,970 1.000 93,221
PremiumTerror ($) 628 111,963 400,815 21.000 5,877,503
PremiumProperty ($) 628 1,238,668 2,503,894 2,106 29,731,212
PremiumTerror=LimitTerror ($) 628 0.592 1.645 0.001 22.195
PremiumProperty=LimitProperty ($) 628 4.848 7.973 0.290 99.948
28Table IV
Descriptive Statistics - Supply Side - Insurance Companies
Summary statistics for supply-side data on the insurance companies providing property and terrorism
coverage to all the ﬁrms in our sample in 2007 using annual A.M. Best Insurance Reports-P/C US
& Canada (Version 2008.1). Full information on insurance supplier for 421 of the 628 large compa-
nies.The ﬁnal sample consists of supply side data from 15 diﬀerent insurance suppliers. Data deﬁni-
tions: Frac LimitTerror, the ratio between the limit of the terrorism insurance policy i (i.e., maxi-
mum possible payment the insurers will have to make for its client i) over the total insurance premi-
ums collected for all lines of business exposed to terrorism risk from all the client ﬁrms of insurer j.
Frac LimitProperty, the ratio between the limit of the property insurance policy i (i.e., maximum possi-
ble payment the insurers will have to make for its client i) over the total insurance premiums collected
for all property lines of business from all the client ﬁrms of insurer j. Total assets and overall liquidity.
Obs. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Frac LimitTerror 421 0.104 0.174 5.29E-07 0.991
Frac LimitProperty 421 0.075 0.127 4.26E-07 0.934
Total Assets ($ million ) 421 48,114 45,154 771.911 124,644.300



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Insurance Demand and Pricing for Terrorism & Property Insurance - Sample
Selection
Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980) estimates for premium (Supply) and insurance coverage ((Demand) for
terrorism and property insurance (full sample). The 1st estimates regress a dummy variable sample on
TIV , the total insured value of company i and the selection variable ﬂood insurance. Sample switches
to one if the company has bought terrorism insurance and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables in
the supply side equation are Frac Limitcij, the share of company i’s property or terror limit in insurer
j’s portfolio, ln(Limitcij) , the policy limit of the respective type of insurance c, Covercij, the degree of
coverage of each policy, Assetsj, the total assets of insurer j and Liquidity, the insurer’s overall liquidity.
The explanatory variables in the demand side equation are TIV , the total insured value of company i and
Premium=Limit, the cost of insurance (premium per $1,000 of coverage limit for the respective type of
insurance). The ﬁrst 4 columns present estimates for the full sample, followed by 4 columns with estimates
for a New York subsample and 4 columns with estimates for a subsample containing all other regions. All
speciﬁcation include industry and region speciﬁc.
1st stagee Terror Property
Supplyc Demandd Supplyc Demandd
ln(TIV ) 0:051 0:632  0:059 0:574  0:101



















  0:616  0:124  0:125 0:005
(0:575) (0:168) (0:317) (0:119)
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 1,808 441 441 441 441
R2 0.606 0.672
Log Likelihood -957.790
Notes: aAgriculture is the omitted industry dummy. bCentral Midwest is the omitted region dummy.




. dDependent variable is Cover. eDependent variable is sample, a
dummy that switches to one if the company is in the sample of companies that have terrorism coverage
and 0 otherwise (Probit). ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
32Table VIII
Insurance Demand FE-Estimates
Fixed Eﬀects (FE) and Instrumental Variable Fixed Eﬀects (IV-FE) estimates for insurance coverage. Panel
dataset constructed by pooling the sample and generating one observation per type of insurance. Covercij,





, the cost of insurance for company i’s insurance policy
of risk type c with insurer j, TRIA, a dummy variable that switches to one if policy c covers terrorism risk









, an interaction term between premium
and the TRIA dummy. Estimates control for company as well as company-insurer-dyad ﬁxed eﬀects. Frac
limit and an interaction term between insurer j’s expense ratio and TRIA are used as instruments in the


















No. of obs. 1,184 966
R2 0.456 0.594
1st stage F-stat ln(Premium/Limit) 12:40
1st stage F-stat ln(Premium/Limit) X TRIA 7:60
Underid. Test 0:025
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
33